EPSRC Reference: |
EP/C002350/1 |
Title: |
Optimal incentive structures for integrated transport strategies |
Principal Investigator: |
Marsden, Professor GR |
Other Investigators: |
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Researcher Co-Investigators: |
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Project Partners: |
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Department: |
Institute for Transport Studies |
Organisation: |
University of Leeds |
Scheme: |
First Grant Scheme Pre-FEC |
Starts: |
01 June 2005 |
Ends: |
30 November 2007 |
Value (£): |
123,998
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EPSRC Research Topic Classifications: |
Transport Ops & Management |
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EPSRC Industrial Sector Classifications: |
Transport Systems and Vehicles |
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Related Grants: |
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Panel History: |
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Summary on Grant Application Form |
The current emphasis in transport policy is for the design and implementation of integrated strategies to mitigate the worst side effects of the continued growth in car use such as congestion, road accidents and pollution. Much research has and is being conducted on how to design optimal transport strategies. However, many barriers exist to the implementation of optimal strategies including political acceptability. One idea that is beginning to be explored is to give local authorities incentives and penalties to reward good and to penalise bad performance against the targets they set to improve the transport conditions of their local area. However, little research evidence exists to understand what the impacts of such a mechanism would be and whether it will encourage more or less effective strategies.This project will develop and apply a game theory approach to examining the behavioural impacts of incentive regimes on local transport strategy development. Game theory was developed for studying strategic interactions between small numbers of participants whose actions impinge on each other. The project will survey local authorities and the national government to determine the current rules of the game. A theoretical model of these interactions will then be developed. The theory will be explored through an innovative experiment involving real transport planners using specially modified software which simulates transport strategy development. The experiment will attempt to define optimal incentive regimes to encourage local authorities to achieve key objectives. In addition to answering key research questions about targets and incentives, the project will provide guidance on how this technique can be applied elsewhere in the transport and wider engineering policy field.
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Key Findings |
This information can now be found on Gateway to Research (GtR) http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk
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Potential use in non-academic contexts |
This information can now be found on Gateway to Research (GtR) http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk
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Impacts |
Description |
This information can now be found on Gateway to Research (GtR) http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk |
Summary |
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Date Materialised |
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Sectors submitted by the Researcher |
This information can now be found on Gateway to Research (GtR) http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk
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Project URL: |
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Further Information: |
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Organisation Website: |
http://www.leeds.ac.uk |